D10 Strategic risk analysis methods

Topic

Studying the dynamics of escalation, deterrence, and strategic stability—as previously outlined by the relevant processes in this catalog—requires analytical tools rather than physical instruments. Game theory formally models the decisions of rational actors under varying assumptions regarding information and incentives; this formalization makes it possible to identify which configurations of capabilities and doctrines tend to be stable and which unstable, thereby revisiting the core question raised by the deterrence model.

Decision-window analysis quantifies—across various technological scenarios—the verification window that command-and-control and automation models in this catalog have already identified as the critical variable determining the available human margin. Escalation simulation exercises, in which teams of analysts represent different actors to explore how a hypothetical crisis might unfold, test the perception-response cycle (described by the escalation model) within a controlled environment. Finally, comparative historical analysis of nuclear near-misses systematically examines documented episodes—such as those described by the false-alarm and accidental-escalation models in this catalog—to identify common patterns and lessons applicable to future risk reduction.

Thus, this model—which begins by applying game theory to the same stability question raised in Part I of this catalog—rounds out the entire set by demonstrating that these analytical methods (drawn from political science, economics, and international security studies) constitute the non-physical, yet equally essential, counterpart to the physical measurement methods that opened Part IV.

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